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1. INTRODUCTION
Most of the available empirical information on economic inequality in developing
countries refers to the distribution of income among earners. This information constitutes an
important part of a complete description of the labor market and related distributions of
income, but it is less helpful in the analysis of inequality as a welfare issue. A more relevant
approach is to compare incomes and consumption expenditures among households of equal
size and composition. This paper focus particular attention on couples with one child less than
18 years living in urban regions of the Chinese provinces Sichuan and Liaoning. Our
emphasize on couples with one child is due to the fact that this specific household group
constitutes roughly half the population of urban households in these provinces. Thus, we also
obtain important information about economic inequality among children. Moreover, to allow
for comparison across persons we also apply household income divided by household size as
welfare indicator.
This study is based on the State Statistical Bureau's Urban Household Survey for
1990. Our methodological approach is mainly based on a measure of inequality, called the
A-coefficient, which is closely related to the Gini coefficient. As a supplement we also
provide estimates for the Gird coefficient. The essential difference between these two
measures of inequality is that the A-coefficient has a stronger focus than the Gini coefficient
on the relative incomes at the bottom of the distribution. This means that the A-coefficient
exhibits higher degree of inequality aversion than the Gini coefficient, irrespective the
functional form of the income distribution in question.
The observed distribution of income is a result of a process governed by institutional
conditions and individual decisions. By decomposing the overall inequality in the distribution
of income with respect to the major income sources we obtain information about the
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formation of income inequality resulting from this process. Similarly, we decompose overall
expenditure inequality in order to analyze the welfare effects from raising prices on certain
commodities and of introducing commodity taxation and subsidies. The results of the
inequality decomposition enable us to reveal whether subsidizing one commodity financed by
a tax on another commodity improves social welfare or not. Therefore, these results can be
used to identify those pairs of commodities for which welfare improvements are possible.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the properties of the employed
measures of inequality and the related method of decomposition. Section 3 deals with the
description of income inequality and Sections 4 and 5 examine the household expenditure and
savings patterns, respectively. Section 6 summarises and concludes the paper.
2. MEASUREMENT AND DECOMPOSITION OF INEQUALITY
In order to evaluate the deviation of each households income from that of a household
living in a society of complete equality, the standard approach is to employ the Lorenz curve.
The Lorenz curve relates the cumulative proportion of income units to the cumulative
proportion of income received when units are arranged in ascending order of their income.
Thus, the Lorenz curve captures the essence of inequality when inequality is defined as the
deviation from the state of equality and restricted to satisfy the principles of transfers and
scale invariance. The principle of scale invariance states that inequality should remain
unaffected if each income is altered in the same proportion and it requires, therefore, the
inequality measure to be independent of the scale of measurement The principle of transfers
implies that if a =der of income takes place from a richer to a poorer person without
changes in the relative positions, the level of inequality diminishes. When employed as a
criterion for ranking income distributions the Lorenz curve is, however, incomplete.
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Therefore, several summary measures of inequality have been derived to provide complete
ranking of distributions. The most widely used measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient,
which satisfies the principles of scale invariance and transfers. The reader is referred to Sen
(1973) for a more comprehensive discussion of the normative implications of different
measures of inequality.
As is weliknown, the Gini coefficient (G) is related to the Lorenz curve (L) in the
following way
(2.1)	 G 5[ 1 -2L(u)Nu.
The Gini coefficient offers a method for ranking distributions and quantifying the differences
in inequality between distributions which is widely used in applied work. This practice,
however, is questionable. Evidently, no single measure can reflect all aspects of inequality
of a distribution, only summarize it to a certain extent. Consequently, it is important to have
alternatives to the Gini coefficient. As pointed out by Atkinson (1970), the Gini coefficient
assigns more weight to transfers in the centre of a unimodal distribution than at the tails. As
an alternative to the Gini coefficient, we will employ an inequality measure - the A-
coefficient - that assigns more weight to transfers at the lower tail than at the centre and the
upper tail. For any distribution with the exception of the distribution displaying complete
inequality, the cost of inequality is higher when measured by A than by G. Therefore, the
total income which must be sacrificed in order to achieve complete equality is always larger
for A than for G.
The A-coefficient, see Aaberge (1986), has a similar geometric interpretation and
relation to the inequality curve M defined by
M(u) E[X IX5F -1(u)] o Su S 1 ,(2.2)
EX
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as the Gini coefficient has to the Lorenz curve. Here X has distribution function F. The A-
coefficient is defmed by
(2.3)	 A	 -M(u)]clu.
If X is an income variable, then M(u) for a fixed u expresses the ratio of the mean income
of the poorest 100u per cent of the population to the mean income of the population. As is
wellknown, the egalitarian line of the Lorenz curve is the straight line joining the points (0,0)
and (1,1). The egalitarian line of the M-curve is the horizontal line joining the points (0,1)
and (1,1). Thus, the universe of M-curves is bounded by a unit square, while the universe of
Lorenz-curves is bounded by a triangle. Therefore, there is a sharper visual distinction
between two different M-curves than between the two corresponding Lorenz curves. Note that
the M-curve will be equal to the diagonal line (M(u)=u) if and only if the underlying
distribution is uniform (0,a) for an arbitrary a. The A-coefficient then takes the value 0.5,
while the maximum attainable value is 1 and the minimum attainable value is 0.
Note that M(u) = L(u)/u, which implies
(2.4)
	
[1.  L(u) 11u.
Alternative expressions for G and A are given by
5
-y
G = 1 ff(Y-x)dF(x)dRY) 2"- 1 Y(2F(Y)- 1X1F(Y)EX 0 0 	EX
and
(2.6) "ryri	 (y -x)Ex 	dF(x)c1F(y) 115t. fy(1 +logF(y))dF(y),
respectively.
Given the inequality in the distribution function F measured by A or G, the next step
is to identify the sources that make substantial contribution to the inequality. Assume that the
main variable X is the sum of s different factor components,
X E xi.
1-1




where MI is the ratio between the means of Xi and X, respectively, and al can be interpreted
as the conditional A-inequality of factor i given the units rank order in X. Analogously,
(2.9)	 G = E
1-1
where yi is related to G and has a similar interpretation as ai related to A.
Notice that ai and yi are measures of correlation between factor i, Xi, and X. Assume
for example that pi > O. Then, a negative value of ai or yi expresses negative correlation and




alogA	 (cci _ 1)
aloggi
i= 1,2,...,s
alogG _	 (Yi _	 .1,2,...,s.
"Tgiffi -
positive value expresses a disequalizing effect on the inequality in F. For gi < 0, then positive
values of al and express an equalizing effect on the inequality in F. We call al and yi
concentration coefficients which is in accordance with the tradition initiated by Mahalanobis
(1960).
If a, and 'yi are equal to 0, then every household (or individual) receives an equal
amount of factor i. Thus, factor i does neither hold a disequalizing nor an equalizing effect
on the distribution F of X. We say that factor i holds a neutral effect.
The above interpretation of the concentration coefficients is based on a simultaneous
examination of the influence from the different factor components on the overall income
inequality. Alternatively, we can ask the following question: What is the impact on overall
income inequality from solely increasing factor i income, given that all the concentration
coefficients are assumed fixed? The answer is given by the following elasticities which are
, established by straightforward differentiation
The formulas (2.10) and (2.11) yield the marginal effects on A and G from a small increase
of an income factor, conditional on fixed concentration coefficients. From the expressions
(2.10) and (2.11) we see that overall inequality will increase (decrease) if and only if the
current concentration coefficient is larger (smaller) than the overall inequality.
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3. THE STRUCTURE OF INEQUALITY IN DISTRIBUTIONS OF INCOME
In this section we provide information on income inequality among households living
in urban regions of Sichuan and Liaoning for 1990. A household is defmed to include all
persons living in the same dwelling and having common board. Contrary to European
countries we must expect that wage earnings have a modest impact on income inequality in
China, since the basic wages are determined by a set of guidelines given by the government.
The introduction of bonus payments may, however, give rise to income inequality. The bonus
payments are included in the wage earnings, which are divided into a state-owned sector and
a collective-owned sector. Additionally to bonus payments, wage earnings in state-owned or
collective-owned units also include base wage, floating salary and contractual income. We
refer to Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of these income components. The workers
also receive housing subsidies and covering of medical insurance from the work unit. These
subsidies are the main sources of the income factor "other income from work units".
The basic income variable is defmed as follows:
income = Z wage earnings in state-owned units
+ L wage earnings in collective-owned units
+ E other income from work units
+ E income from current transfers
+ E other income.
Note that the main factors of "income from current transfers" are pension and price
compensation. The variable "other income" includes income from selfemployment, secondary
employment, property and gifts, payments to surveyed households and other special income.
The basic unit of observation is the household and the reference period in one year. With
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these concepts the "I" in the definition of income means sum over all persons who were
members of the household during 1990.
3.1. Inequality and decomposition of inequality in the distribution of household
income
As a result of the current birth control policy couples with 1 child is the most common
urban household type in China. In Sichuan and Liaoning couples with 1 child constitute 36.2
and 54.1 per cent of the total number of urban households, respectively. Accordingly, most
children are living in three-persons families. For these reasons, it is important to focus on this
household group.
In table 1 we report mean income by decile groups for all households and for couples
with 1 child younger than 18 years.








All households Couples with
1 child
All households Couples with
1 child
1 2315 (121) 2836 (124) 3087 (105) 3495 (79)
2 3498 (102) 3530 (107) 3993 (73) 4037 (57)
3 4043 (88) 3968 (42) 4463 (74) 4362 (76)
4 4514 (84) 4413 (115) 4900 (78) 4651 (83)
5 4934 (78) 4764 (114) 5266 (62) 4993 (101)
6 5334 (93) 5052 (100) 5573 (71) 5310 (56)
7 5761 (82) 5428 (124) 5978 (77) 5544 (57)
8 6367 (141) 5780 (107) 6462 (106) 5850 (88)
9 7231 (122) 6312 (170) 7367 (181) 6284 (101)
10 9291 (328) 7295 (169) 9780 (281) 7542 (255)
All 5329 (85) 4938 (91) 5687 (77) 5207 (66)
*) Standard deviations are given in the parantheses.
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According to Table 1 the mean income of the richest 10 per cent of the 1 child
couples in Sichuan and Liaoning were 2.6 and 2.2 times the mean income of the poorest 10
per cent, respectively. The corresponding figures for the ratio between the richest 5 per cent
and the poorest 5 per cent were 3.0 and 2.5, respectively.
In order to sum up the detailed information given by Table 1, Table 2 provides
estimates of two summary measures of inequality.
Table 2. Estimates of the A-coefficient*) and the Gini coefficient in distributions of income
for households living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning
Province Sichuan Liaoning




























`) Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
The estimates given in Tables 1 and 2 reveal that there were a higher income level and
a smaller degree of inequality in urban Liaoning than in urban Sichuan. For couples with 1
child the income level in urban Liaoning was 5.5 per cent above the income level in urban
Sichuan. The higher inequality among all households than among couples with 1 child was
mainly due to variation in household size and composition. However, in spite of this variation
the degree of the inequality was very low compared to that of other developing countries
which is demonstrated by the Gini coefficient estimates displayed in Table 3. The figures in
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Table 3 are related to distributions of income for urban households and are taken from Jairi
(1975).
Table 3. Estimates of the Gini coefficient hi distributions of income for urban households in
various countries
Asian countries Latin American countries
India (1967-68) 0.465 Argentina (1963) 0.385
Hong Kong (1967-68) 0.430 Chile (1968) 0.376




Next we examine the influence on the income inequality from different kind of income
factors. The results of the decomposition of the A-coefficient are given in Table 4. However,
as a supplement, corresponding results for the Gini coefficient are given in Appendix 2.
Table 4. Decomposition of the A-coefficiente) in distributions of households income with
respect to wage earnings in state-owned units (1) and in collective-owned units (2),
other income from work units (3), income from current transfers (4) and other


















All 1 80.9 53.9 0.454
households 2 -3.3 8.4 -0.118
(0.303) 3 9.4 7.1 0.404
4 .	 5.9 22.1 0.081
Sichuan
5, 7.0 8.5 0.251,
Couples 1 92.2 61.2 0.342
with 2 -18.6 12.5 -0.338
1 child 3 12.5 8.8 0.321
(0.227) 4 3.7 10.4 0.081
5 10.1 7.1 0.324
All 1 83.6 53.6 0.402
household 2 2.9 17.1 0.043
(0.257) 3 7.6 6.9 0.283
4 -4.9 15.1 -0.083
5 10.8 7.3 0.379
Liaoning
Couples 1 104.4 53.7 0.354
with 2 -23.0 21.8 -0.192
1 child 3 8.7 8.2 0.193
(0.182) 4 0.4 9.7 0.007
5 9.5 6.6 0.264
*) Fraction of overall inequality =
(Fraction of total income) • (Concentration coefficient)
Overall inequality
Example: 
The fraction of overall inequality held by wage earnings in state-owned units among




The first and second column of Table 4 show the relative contribution from the major income
factors to overall inequality and to total income, respectively. The third column gives the
concentration coefficients. The positive concentration coefficients for wage earnings in state-
owned units, other income from work units and other income demonstrate that these income
factors had a disequarizing effect on the current distributions of income. Note that wage
earnings in state-owned units was the major income factor, contributing to 50 - 60 per cent
of total income. However, this income factor also had the strongest disequalizing effect on
the distributions of household income. Income from current transfers had a modest
disequalizing effect, which means that the households received approximately an equal
amount of transfers. Wage earnings in collective-owned units had, however, negative
concentration coefficients which means that this income factor had an equalizing effect on the
distributions of income, i.e. wage earnings in collective-owned units were on average larger
among the poor than among the rich households.
In order to facilitate the understanding of the estimated concentration coefficients in
Table 4 we provide more detailed information in Table 5 by decomposing the deciles of
income for couples with 1 child living in urban Sichuan by the five income factors we
introduced above. Note that the decile mean incomes in the first column are equal to the sum
of the corresponding means in the remaining columns. Table 5 confirms the results
summarized in Table 4 for 1 child couples living in urban Sichuan. We also see that wage
earnings in collective-owned units was the predominant income source for the 10 per cent
poorest couples, while wage earnings in state-owned units constituted as much as 62.8 per
cent of the incomes for the 10 per cent richest couples. The 10 per cent richest earned on
average more income on each income factor than the mean factor incomes and held the
largest decile specific means for every factor except wage earnings in collective-owned units.
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Table 5. Mean income for couples with 1 child living in urban Sichuan with respect to wage
earnings in state-owned units (1), and in collective-owned units (2), other income





Decile specific mean factor incomes
1 2 3
1 2 836 957 1 115 187 340 237
2 3 530 1 827 826 278 454 145
3 3 968 1 766 900 247 741 314
4 4 413 2 736 537 367 522 251
5 4 764 3 110 515 418 464 257
6 • 5 052 3 158 604 427 589 274
7 5 428 3 851 219 505 591 262
8 5 780 3 831 569 456 441 484
9 6 312 4 380 248 668 544 472
10 7 294 4 581 619 810 471 813
All
, 
4 938 3 019 615 436 516 351
As emphasized in Section 2, the above interpretation of the concentration coefficients
as having equalizing/disequalizing effects on the current distribution of income, is based on
the assumption that the current income factors are operating simultaneously, which means that
decisions affecting each of the income factors are assumed to have been made simultaneously.
Next we will examine the distributional impact from increasing a particular income factor,
while the remaining income factors are kept fixed. Thus, according to (2.10) and the estimated
concentration coefficients displayed in Table 4, a small increase in wage earnings in state-
owned units or of other income from work units will increase income inequality for all
distributions. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the concentration coefficients
remain unchanged. Further we see that an increase in wage earnings from collective-owned
units or in income from current transfers would have reduced income inequality. If, for
example, wage earnings in collective-owned units for 1 child couples in Sichuan is increased
by 1 per cent then income inequality would be reduced by 0.3 per cent. However, by
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increasing wage earnings in state-owned units by 1 per cent then income inequality would
have increased by 0.3 per cent.
3.2. Inequality in the distribution of per capita income
The results for all households reported in Section 3.1 provides important information
about household income inequality, but it must be interpreted with caution when used as a
basis for an analysis of welfare. This is mainly due to variation in household size and
composition. To allow for the fact that for some households the total income may be shared
by several persons while for others it may be enjoyed by just one or a few persons, we need
an alternative to household income as an indicator of welfare. An indicator of welfare also
ought to reflect that there are economies of scale when individuals combine to form
households. The main argument is that a household with two members may not be able to live
as cheaply as a single person, but two persons can certainly live more cheaply together than
apart since certain consumption goods can be shared. These facts were the main motivation
behind our focusing on couples with 1 child in the previous section. However, since we then
merely succeed to compare the welfare levels of about half the urban population of Liaoning
and one third of the urban population of Sichuan, we supplement this information by
introducing household income divided by household size as welfare indicator and by
analyzing the distribution of this indicator among individuals. The drawback of this approach
is its neglect of possible economics of scale. However, the fact that expenditure to food,
clothes and daily articles accounted for more than 70 per cent of total consumption,
controlling for economies of scale may be less important.
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Table 6. Mean, A-coefficient and Gini coefficient in the distribution of per capita household
income among persons by province
Province Sichuan Liaoning
Number of observations 1 784 1 983




Gini coefficient 0.187 0.147
(0.004) (0.002)
The results in Table 6 confirm that there were relatively modest income differences
in urban Sichuan and urban Liaoning. Note that the distributions of per capita household
income among persons possessed a higher degree of inequality than the related distributions
of income among couples with 1 child. This may be due to a possible underestimation of the
welfare levels of larger households relatively to smaller ones, since the chosen welfare
indicator neglects a possible presence of economies of scale.
4. THE STRUCTURE OF INEQUALITY IN DISTRIBUTIONS OF HOUSEHOLD
EXPENDITURE
The aim of this section is to improve our understanding of current urban household
expenditure patterns in urban Sichuan and Liaoning and thus of the structure of aggregate
consumer demand and the welfare implications of consumers.
As for analyzing income distributions we examine distributions of expenditure by
employing a summary measure of inequality. This approach is particular attractive since it
also provides information about the influence of major expenditure categories on the
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inequality in the distribution of total household expenditure. The interest for decomposing
expenditure inequality is motivated by the fact that the observed distribution of expenditure
is the result of a process where households make decisions on consumption of different
consumption goods and services simultaneously. In this paper we defme the major commodity
categories to be:
(1) food




The major commodities in (4) are bicycles, television sets, radios, cameras, watches and
furniture. The category (5) consists mainly of fuel, housing, daily articles, culture and
services. Fuel is mainly used for cooking purposes and includes coal, firewood, gas and
electricity. The category daily articles includes small appliances, cosmetics, laundry and toilet
soaps. Because of its importance food is further divided into five components:
(i) grain
(ii) fresh vegetables
(iii) meat and eggs
(iv) fish
(v) other food.
It should be noted that Chinese households also receive goods and services free of charge or
at reduced prices. Free movies, excursions and transportation are examples, together with
subsidies for grain, housing, fuel and medical services. This study is based on household
expenditure data where the value of price subsidies is ignored.
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4.1. Inequality and decomposition of inequality in distributions of household expenditure
As shown in Table 7, the level of household expenditure was higher in Liaoning than
in Sichuan. The results also suggest a higher degree of inequality in distributions of
expenditure in Sichuan than in Liaoning. Therefore, the main features in the differences
between distributions of income seem to correspond to the differences between the respective
distributions of expenditure.
Table 7. Mean*), A-coefficient and Gini coefficient in distributions of household expenditure
for households living in urban Sichuan and Liaoning
Province Sichuan Liaoning




Mean 4 192 3 953 4 626 4 368
(76) (95) (77) (83)
A-coefficient 0.324 0.263 0.302 0.258
(0.010) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009)
Gini 0.221 0.182 0.214 0.184
coefficient (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
*) Standard deviations are given in the parantheses.
Next we examine the influence on the distributions of expenditure from the
expenditures on different types of consumption goods and services. From the results displayed
in Tables 8 and 9 we see that none of the expenditure categories had an equalizing effect on
the distribution of total expenditure. The main features are that food expenditures contributed
considerably less to overall inequality than to total expenditure and that durables contributed
considerably more to overall inequality than to total expenditure. To be specific, the
contribution of expenditure on food to total expenditure and overall inequality for couples
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with 1 child were about 50 and 25 per cent, respectively, both in Sichuan and Liaoning.
Durables contributed between two and three times as much to overall inequality as to total
expenditure, which means that expenditure on durables are concentrated at high total
expenditure levels. The contribution of clothing expenditures to overall inequality were 16-18
per cent and reflected its fraction of total expenditure. This implies that household with low,
medium and high clothing expenditure on average had the same proportion of total clothing
expenditure as of total expenditure. Also note from Table 9 that poor households spent
relatively more on tobacco, liquor and tea than their proportion of total expenditure should
promise.
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Table 8. Decomposition of the A-coefficient in distributions of household expenditure with
respect to five food expenditure categories and four non-food expenditure categories


















(1) Food 37.3 52.7 0.230
(i) Grain 2.7 5.6 0.159
(ii) Fresh













(0.324) food 16.0 18.3 0.284
(2) Tobacco,
liquor and
tea 5.2 6.4 0.262
Sichuan (3) Clothing 17.9 14.8 0.391
(4) Durables 28.4 13.5 0.683
(5) Other
expend. 11.2 12.5 0.291
(1) 25.0 48.5 0.135
CO 1.2 5.2 0.059
(ii) 1.6 6.0 0.069
COuples















(0.263) (3) 17.4 16.0 0.286
(4) 38.2 15.1 0.666




















(1) Food 32.8 52.8 0.188
(i) Grain 2.1 53 0.121
(ii) Fresh













(0.302) food 14.2 18.9 0.227
(2) Tobacco,
liquor and
tea 6.1 6.9 0.267
Liaoning (3) Clothing 16.5 16.3 0.305
(4) Durables 36.6 15.3 0.725
(5) Other
expend. 8.0 8.7 0.276
(1) 25.8 50.9 0.131
(i) 0.3 4.4 0.019
(ii) 2.3 7.0 0.084















(0.258) (3) 15.8 17.2 0.237
(4) 46.4 16.4 0.728
(5) 7.9 8.5 0.240
Since expenditures on food accounted for as much as 50 per cent of total expenditure,
Table 8 provides a further breakdown of food expenditure into five food commodity
categories. As can be seen from the estimated concentration coefficients, expenditures on
grain and fresh vegetables contributed with the lowest disequalizing effects on the distribution
of total expenditure, for couples with 1 child, the figures of these concentration coefficients
were close to zero. This means that expenditures on grain and fresh vegetables were quite
evenly distributed over the population of couples with 1 child. The estimated effects of
21
expenditures on grain seem reasonable since grain is heavily subsidized. Fresh vegetables
were, however, mainly purchased in the free market In that context the approximately neutral
effect of fresh vegetables on overall expenditure inequality are rather surprising. It implies
that the households preferences for fresh vegetables were independent of their purchasing
power.
Table 9. Mean expenditure by deciles for urban Sichuan couples with 1 child decomposed














1 2 117 1 306 173 269 64 305
2 2 766 1 642 180 500 90 352
3 3 060 1 822 319 438 114 367
4 3 260 1 832 266 483 249 428
5 3 597 1 941 220 551 430 454
6 3 888 2 018 293 742 • 312 523
7 4 155 1 961 255 814 576 549
8 4 512 2 053 342 587 NO 730
9 5 259 2 354 365 878 966 695
10 6 915 2 220 340 1 049 2 356 950
-
All 3 953 1 915 276 631 596 535
Table 9 provides more detailed information than Table 8 about differences in the
expenditure pattern among couples with 1 child living in urban Sichuan. The most striking
result is that the 10 per cent of the couples with the highest total expenditure on average spent
considerably more on durables than the remaining part of the population; 2.4 times the mean
expenditure on durables for the ninth decile and 36.8 times the mean expenditure on durables
for the first decile. Also note that the tenth decile both had the highest clothing expenditure
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and other expenditures. Couples located in the upper 50 per cent of the expenditure
distribution spent approximately the same amount on food and on tobacco, liquor and tea.
We also examine the impact on the overall expenditure inequality from increasing
expenditure in one category at a time, ceteris paribus. Table 8 demonstrates that food
expenditure has the lowest concentration coefficient for all populations. Thus, by increasing
food consumption by 1 per cent then overall expenditure inequality will decrease among all
households in urban Sichuan and Liaoning by 0.15 and 0.20 per cent, respectively, provided
that the concentration coefficients are kept unchanged. The breakdown of food expenditure
reveals that grain has the lowest concentration coefficient By doubling grain consumption the
overall expenditure inequality would have decreased by 4 per cent both among couples with
one child living in urban Sichuan and urban Liaoning. As noticed, durables were heavily
concentrated at high total expenditure levels. Therefore, by increasing durables expenditure
by 1 per cent the overall expenditure inequality among couples with one child living in urban
Sichuan and Liaoning will increase by 0.23 and 0.30 per cent, respectively.
4.2. Welfare effects of commodity taxation
Note that the decomposition of the Gini-coefficient has long been used as a method
for describing the relationship between functional and size distributions of income and to
analyze nonlinear Engel curves by means of the Lorenz curve (see e.g. Kakwani, 1980). The
decomposition method has also been employed for evaluating the welfare effects from income
and commodity taxation. This methodological approach was also used by Yitzhaki and
Slemrod (1991) in order to examine the effect on social welfare from subsidizing expenditure
on one commodity by means of a tax on another commodity such that net tax revenue does
not change. In this section we will consider related questions, but restrict our ambition to the
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estimation of direct effects, i.e. the impact of behavioral responses (indirect effects) will be
neglected.
Let X be total expenditure for a randomly selected household and assume that X is
the sum of s expenditure categories. Now suppose that we introduce a tax (Or) on expenditure
category (commodity) r and a subsidy (0k) on expenditure category k, so that total tax revenue
does not change. Thus, Or is negative and Ok is positive. Let the tax revenue P be defined by
(2.12) P ekth erge
The requirement of unchanged tax revenue, P4, leads to the following expression for total
household expenditure
	
(2.13)	 X = (1+13k)Xk + (1+ €)X, + E xi
The decomposition of the A-coefficient when X is defined by (2.13) is given by
(2.14) (1+e *I,	 (1+e)grA = 	k  ak 	 ar +
• 	*kJ. ti
Inserting (2.12) and (2.13) into (2.14) gives
(2.15)
11
A = ektIk (ock-a) E
lÅ 	iiLt
By differentiating (2.15) with respect to ek, we get
(2.16)	
P =
Analogously, we fmd for the Gini-coefficient that
24
(2.17) ai:; I	 -V*aek P.°
Under the current Chinese economic system, grain consumption is subsidized by price
supports. According to the concentration coefficients estimates in Table 8, grain expenditures
had approximately a neutral effect on overall expenditure inequality. Thus, by increasing the
price support on grain welfare will be improved, provided that the behavioral responses do
not substantially change the concentration coefficients. Suppose now that the subsidies on
grain are to be fmanced by a tax on another commodity. Then, according to (2.16) and the
estimates of Table 8, it would be most favorable to tax the consumption of durables. If this
tax reform did not increase the tax burden then substantial welfare improvement would be
obtained. By comparing the concentration coefficients in Table 8, (2.16) can be used to
identify alternative welfare improving tax reforms, though less favorable than the tax reform
where we tax the consumption of durables and subsidize the consumption on grain. Note that
we arrive at the same conclusion if these welfare evaluations are based on (2.17) and the
estimates of Table G8 in Appendix 2.
5. THE STRUCTURE OF HOUSEHOLDS SAVING BY INCOME
The purpose of this section is to provide information on the relative importance of
lower, middle, and upper household income classes in the total of households saving. The
reason for highlighting the distribution of savings by income, as opposed to alternative
economic characteristics, is the important role played by income in almost all saving theories.
Saving is defined as the difference between annual real income and annual real
expenditure. Accordingly, investment in consumer durable goods is not included in saving.
As a supplement to the description of the saving behavior we, however, provide similar
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information of the purchasing behavior on durables.
For the judgement and interpretation of the results in this section it is important to
note that the relative importance of different income classes saving can be affected by the
time period covered. Firstly, it is possible that households with high current income in any
year tend to have higher income than normal and hence save more than they ordinarily do,
while households with low current income have lower income than normal and hence save
less than they ordinarily do. Second, in many countries there are evidence of cyclical variation
in the savings behavior suggesting that the proportion of savings accounted for by the upper
income groups is higher in an economic recession than during a boom. However, lack of
individual time series data prevent us from dealing with these issues.
Based on data from the Urban Household Survey we are in the position to break down
household savings into income groups. Therefore, we can estimate the proportions of savings
accounted for by the lower, middle and upper income classes. Table 10 shows the
distributions of savings and expenditure on durables by income decile groups for all
households and for couples with 1 child living in urban Sichuan and urban Liaoning.
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Table 10. Mean saving and expenditure on durables by income decile groups for urban
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Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
According to Table 10, the 30 per cent richest households accounted for about 50 per
cent of total savings, with not much difference in this respect between all households and
couples with 1 child. The results also suggest:a somewhat greater concentration of saving in
the upper income groups for Liaoning than for Sichuan. This difference, however, is to a
certain extent neutralized by a greater concentration of expenditure on durables for Sichuan
than for Liaoning. It is found that the 30 per cent richest households are responsible for 40-45
per cent of the total expenditure on durables for Liaoning and roughly 5 per cent points
higher for Sichuan.
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Table 11. Saving-income ratios and expenditure on durables income ratios by income decile
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All 21.3 10.6 20.0 I	 12.1 18.7 12.4 16.1 I	 13.8
Table 11 demonstrates that the similarities between the distributions of savings for
Sichuan and Liaoning are maintained in the saving-income ratios between the provinces. The
saving rate is on average close to 25 per cent among the 20 per cent richest households and
15 per cent among the 20 per cent poorest households. The surprisingly high savings rates
among the poor suggest that the propensity to save is equally strong among the poor as
among the rich.
Now, assume that the subsistence expenditure on food for couples with one child is
equal to the average food expenditure for the 5 per cent poorest couples with one child living
in urban Sichuan, which was estimated to be 1 300 Yuan in 1990. Then it was found that the
average propensity to save out of total income minus subsistence expenditure on food was
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constant over most of the range of income. A similar result holds for Liaoning except for the
10 per cent richest couples with one child where the propensity to save was much stronger
than for the remaining part of the population.
Since for some purposes it is desirable to add investment in consumer durables to
personal savings information about expenditure on durables is displayed in Tables 10 and 11.
The results demonstrate the importance of examining savings behavior in relation to
purchasing behavior of durables. The low savings rate for the fourth income decile group of
couples with one child in Sichuan and the slightly negative saving rate for the third income
decile of couples with one child in Liaoning have to be judged against the particular high
expenditure on durables to income ratio for these income groups. Similarly, the third income
decile group of couples with one child in Sichuan differs from the remaining low income
groups by holding a considerable higher saving rate and lower rate of expenditure on
durables.
Tables 10 and 11 show that only a few of the income groups had low savings rates,
which can be due to the circumstance that the households with negative or low positive
savings rates are dispersed across most income groups. Table 12 demonstrates a similarity
between the structures of dissavings over provinces. The proportion of households with
negative savings was indeed 7 percentage points higher in Liaoning compared to Sichuan.
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Table 12. Proportion of household with negative saving, mean level of dissaving, mean





































The mean incomes of households with negative savings were roughly equal to the
mean incomes of their respective populations, while the mean expenditure on durables were
3-4 times the respective population means. For households with negative reported savings the
purchases of durables were either financed by such incomes as bank deposits withdrawn,
nonreported transfers from parents and other relatives or/and by other income sources
underreported by the households.
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present a descriptive analysis of the structure of economic inequality
among households living in urban regions of two Chinese provinces, Sichuan and Liaoning,
in 1990. This study is altogether based on data from the State Statistical Bureau's Urban
Household Survey. A particular feature of this survey is that each household administrates
daily records of its cash income and consumption quantities and expenditures.
In order to focus attention on economic inequality, we concentrate on distributions of
income, expenditure and savings among all households and in particular among couples with
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1 child less than 18 years. In 1990, couples with 1 child constituted 36.2 and 54.1 per cent
of the total number of urban households in Sichuan and Liaoning, respectively. The
dominating position of this particular household group is mainly a result of the current birth
control policy in China. Consequently, the majority of the children is thus living together with
their parents in three-person's families. Thus, by focusing on couples with 1 child we also
obtain important information about economic inequality among children living in urban
regions.
Our findings of income inequality show a low level of inequality compared to other
developing countries. The mean income of the richest 5 per cent couples with 1 child living
in Sichuan was, for instance, 3 times the mean income of the poorest 5 per cent. For the
purpose of comparison, however, note that the present study is restricted to households living
in urban regions. By extending the study to include rural regions, income inequality would
presumably rise.
In order to identify the sources of income inequality in urban Sichuan and Liaoning
the overall inequality were decomposed with respect to five major income factors. For each
population, the primary contribution to inequality was wage earnings in state-owned units,
contributing to about 80 per cent of overall inequality while its fraction of total income was
between 50 and 60 per cent. In contrast, wage earnings in collective-owned units had an
equalizing effect on the distribution of income for each population except for the population
of households living in urban Liaoning, for which this income factor was approximately
evenly distributed. Thus, for poor couples with 1 child wage earnings in collective-owned
units was the predominant income source, while for rich couples with 1 child wage earnings
in state-owned units was the predominant income source. Also note that income from current
transfers was approximately evenly distributed over each of the current populations.
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The examination of the distributions of expenditure reveals higher degree of
expenditure inequality than income inequality. This is mainly due to the savings behavior and
the purchases of durables financed by nonreported incomes and transfers from parents and
other relatives. The level of expenditure was about 10 per cent higher in Liaoning than in
Sichuan. In contrast, the corresponding difference in level of income was about 6 per cent.
Moreover, the decomposition of the expenditure inequality shows that food expenditure is the
predominant expenditure factor, contributing to about 50 per cent of total expenditure. Its
contribution to overall inequality is, however, considerably lower. By contrast, durables
contributed between 2 and 3 times as much to overall inequality as to total expenditure. The
major durables are bicycles, television sets, radios and furniture.
A further breakdown of food expenditure into five food commodity categories reveals
that expenditure on grain and fresh vegetables were evenly distributed over couples with 1
child. Another striking result is that the upper 10 per cent in the distribution of total
expenditure spent on durables 4 times the mean expenditure of durables despite that they also
had high expenditure on the remaining consumption categories.
In order to obtain a more complete picture on economic inequality than given by
income and expenditure data, we also provide information about who saves by highlighting
the distribution of savings by income. The estimates show that the 30 per cent richest
households accounted for about 50 per cent of total savings. Moreover, the savings-income
ratio was found to be about 20 per cent with not much difference between poor and rich
households. Nevertheless, as much as close to 16 per cent of the couples with one child living
in urban Sichuan and Liaoning had negative savings rates. These particular households tum
out to have considerably higher expenditure on durables than the mean expenditure on
durables. For these households, purchases of durables were either financed by nonreported
transfers from relatives or/and by other nonreported incomes, such as bank deposits
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withdrawn.
The paper also demonstrates how to utilize the decomposition results for evaluating
the welfare effects from commodity taxation. Our conclusion is that a substantial welfare
improvement would be obtained by increasing the price support on grain followed by a tax
on consumption of durables. Note, however, that these considerations disregard the impact of
behavioral responses. In order to take behavioral aspects into account it is necessary to
employ a structural model, which is the purpose of a follow-up study.
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APPENDIX 1
The Urban Household Survey of China
The annual Urban Household Survey of China is a sample survey which covers all
provinces. The survey collects data on household size and composition, employment status,
education level, income structure and quantities and expenditures by type of commodities.
A particular attractive feature of this survey is its continuity in recording the income
and consumption data. Each household is keeping daily records of its cash income and
consumption quantities and expenditures for monthly collection by survey officias.
The sample of households is selected by adopting a two-stage sampling design. At
each stage stratified systematic sampling is used. In the first stage, a sample of cities and
county towns is selected by the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) and provincial statistical
bureaus. The cities and county towns are according to the size of their non-agricultural
populations selected by means of a systematic sampling procedure. In the second stage 100
households are selected randomly from each selected city and county town. The total sample
size is about 15 000 households. In addition to provide daily income and consumption
accounts the selected households are every month asked questions about household size and
composition and about education and employment status of the household memebers.
In order to reduce non-response and the extent of measurement errors the Urban
Household Survey has been based on a rotation sample since 1988. The rotation proportion
is 1/3 and the rotation period is one year. Furthermore, SSB has also worked out a
comprehensive set of instructions for survey officials in order to improve the data quality. Its
main content deals with the survey officials behavior towards the field operations. They are,
for instance, asked to help the selected households with housework and child care and
otherwise comply with the households customs.
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Income concepts
Total income is all cash income received by the household during the year, but
excluding such incomes as bank deposits withdrawn, money borrowed from relatives or
friends, and repayment of debt by others.
Wages in state-owned or collective-owned units  are the total wages of household
members employed in state-owned or collective-owned enterprises, institutions, government
offices and other organizations. Such wages consist of base wage, bonuses, flowing salary and
contractual income. Floating salary is an unfixed salary, the amount of which depends upon
the quality and quantity of work produced. Contractual income is the income that staff and
workers in some state-owned and collective-owned enterprises earn from work they are
contracted to perform. The amount of the contractual income is equal to the total income
derived from the constracted activities minus all production costs, taxes, and profits set by
contract
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All households 100.0 43 46
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All households 100.0 40 41
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APPENDIX 2
Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient
In the tables below we have used a numbering which will facilitate comparisons with
the corresponding tables for the A-coefficient. Table G4 corresponds to Table 4 and Table G8
to Table 8.
Table G4. Decomposition of the G-coefficient in distributions of urban households income
with respect to wage earnings in state-owned units (1) and in collective-owned
units (2), other income from work units (3), income from current transfers (4)

















All 1 81.7 53.9 0.303
households 2 -5.3 8.4 -0.125
(0.200) 3 9.6 7.1 0.273
4 6.2 22.1 0.056
Sichuan
5 7.7 8.5 0.183,
Couples 1 89.3 61.2 0.216
with 2 -15.8 12.5 -0.188
1 child 3 13.2 8.8 0.221
(0.148) 4 1.3 10.5 0.019
5 12.0 7.1 0.250
All 1 76.7 53.6 0.198
household 2 -1.7 17.1 -0.014
(0.174) 3 6.4 6.9 0.127
4 4.7 15.1 0.043
Liaoning
5, 13.9 7.3 0.263
Couples 1 100.2 53.7 0.228
with 2 -24.2 21.8 -0.136
1 child 3 8.1 8.2 0.121
(0.122) 4 -0.4 9.7 -0.005
5 16.3 6.6 0.303
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Table G8. Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient in distribution of urban household



















(1) Food 33.1 52.7 0.139
(i) Grain 2.2 5.6 0.086
(ii) Fresh













(0.221) food 15.1 183 0.182
(2) Tobacco,
liquor and
tea 4.5 6.4 0.152
Sichuan (3) Clothing 17.8 14.8 0.264
(4) Durables 33.9 13.5 0.554
(5) Other
expend. 10.9 12.5 0.192
(1) 20.5 48.5 0.077
CO 1.0 5.2 0.035
(ii) 1.1 6.0 0.034















(0.182) (3) 16.1 16.0 0.184
(4) 44.4 15.1 0.536




















(1) Food 29.1 52.8 0.118
(i) Grain 1.8 5.3 0.073
(ii) Fresh
veget. 3.3 73 0.092
(iii) Meat and






(0.214) food 12.7 18.9 0.144
(2) Tobacco,
liquor and
tea 5.4 6.9 0.167
Liaoning (3) Clothing 14.7 16.5 0.193
(4) Durables 43.2 36.6 0.606
(5) Other
expend. 7.6 8.0 0.188
(1) 25.8 50.9 0.069
(i) 0.3 4.4 0.005
(ii) 2.3 7.0 0.047















(0.184) (3) 15.8 17.2 0.148
(4) 46.4 16.4 0.617
(5) 7.9 8.5 0.183
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